‘What General Weygand called the “Battle of France” is over. I expect that the battle of Britain is about to begin’
When Prime Minister Winston Churchill spoke these words in the House of Commons on June 18, 1940, he did not know when and where Germany would first strike in its attempt to conquer the United Kingdom.
I would have to wait less than a month to find out the answer: from the air.
The Battle of Britain lasted from the beginning of July to the end of October 1940 and Germany sought to destroy the RAF to obtain the air superiority necessary for an invasion of the islands by German naval and ground forces. The key to success was the Luftwaffe’s destruction of the RAF fighter force. This campaign is divided into different phases. As the battle developed, the Luftwaffe attacked targets further and further from the coast; airfields, radar stations and finally London.
The crucial period of the battle was between August 24 and September 15. Combat Air Command came close to losing when airfields near London were attacked. The decisive turning point was when the Luftwaffe shifted its attention to the capital. This tactical variation allowed the Combat Command to quickly recover its strength to inflict,
on September 15, losses important enough to show the Germans that they could not win the battle.
Preliminary Phase: June – July 10
During June 1940, while the Battle of France was still underway, the Luftwaffe used a small portion of its force, 5-10%, in operations with the United Kingdom. Its objective is reconnaissance of airfields, practice of navigation means, giving crews experience in flying over the Islands (including night flying) and maintaining pressure on the British and their industry.
These types of actions continued in July with a greater number of bombers and began to attack ports such as Falmouth, Plymoutn, Portland, Weymouth and Dover.
Phase 1: July 10 – August 12
The Luftwaffe has attacked shipping since the beginning of the war. In the early days of July 1940 there were encounters over the Channel and the North Sea, leading to the major action on July 10 which was designated the beginning of the Battle of Britain. By targeting vessels in the Channel, the Luftwaffe hoped to reduce Fighter Command’s resources by forcing this traffic to be protected. The Germans did not achieve their goal but rather the opposite by allowing the radars and control systems technical improvements in the detection and direction of the fighters so that were in the air faster and better prepared.
The German test attacks gave practice in response and convinced 11 Group Commander Park to place his planes in small groups. This allowed them to preserve their planes, but often meant facing great inferiority.
Phase 2: Attack on Hunting Fields and Radar Stations August 12-18
On August 12, without ignoring ports and ships, the Luftwaffe began the systematic assault of radar stations and hunting fields. Attacking Manston, Lympne and Hawkinge and radar stations in Kent, Sussex and the Isle of Wright. The operating system of this day would be repeated on the following days. Several bombing raids, consisting of hundreds of aircraft, were launched so that the timing of the attack coincided or was closely followed by another, often on dispersed targets.
Damage caused to the Ventnor radar station on 12 and 16 August left the damage unrepaired until 23 August. The Luftwaffe did not continue the attack, with a few exceptions, on the radar stations, a major tactical error. On August 13, “The Day of the Eagle,” the waves of attacks launched were poorly coordinated and produced moderate success. On the 15th, for the first time, a combined assault by the three Luftwaffe fleets that sought to corner the Fighter Command. The losses inflicted by groups 12 and 13 on Scotland and North England were so severe that it was the first and last intervention of the Luftflotte. On August 15, the hardest fight of the entire battle took place. The next day(16) the Luftwaffe made a smaller effort. On 18 August the airfields at Kenley, Croydon, West Malling and Biggin Hill were bombed, with Kenley heavily damaged. The losses of German Junkers 87 “Stuka” aircraft were so severe on this day that this type of aircraft was withdrawn from the battle.
Phase 3: Attack on the Airfields of Group 11. August 24 – September 6
Bad weather between 19 and 23 August forced a break in the fighting during which the Luftwaffe changed its tactics and established the most dangerous phase of the battle for Fighter Command. The Germans were now concentrating their entire day force against targets in the south east of England, shifting the burden of the attack onto 11 Group and the stations these squadrons controlled to ensure that the maximum number of fighters were brought into battle. The German formations now only contained enough bombers to put 11 Group on the move and were escorted by greater numbers of fighters than before. During this period, on August 27 alone the Luftwaffe made no less than 600 individual flights or sorties. The average was 1000 a day, on August 30 and 31 more than 1600. The number of bombers was only 250 and never more than 400. In the first three days the airfields at Manston, Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden were heavily attacked. Faced with numerous and determined Escort Fighters, the 11 Group fought to reach the bombers. The success
German was partly the result of a new tactic that would produce great anxiety in fighter command in the following weeks. Planes almost continuously patrolled the Strait of Dover and
Occasionally feints were made to the British coast to prepare for real attacks and force the Fighter Command to waste its efforts on unnecessary intrusions.
After six days of the new phase, the overall situation was becoming very serious. Fighter Command was maintaining its defense against the Luftwaffe but was beginning to lose more pilots and aircraft than it could afford. On August 30, Biggin Hill, the vital station guarding the approaches to south London, was hit twice, the second precise and devastating. On the 31st, Debden was heavily bombed in the morning, Croydon and Hornchurch at noon, and Biggin Hill and Hornchurch in the afternoon. The next day Biggin Hill received its sixth attack in three days and again on September 5th. Hornchurch was attacked on the 2nd and North Weald on the 3rd of September. Five advanced airfields and six of the seven sector stations of the Group 11 had been
punished harshly, enough to reduce the effectiveness of his squad. Losses were rising to such a level that they would soon be fatal for the RAF.
Phase 4: The Assault on London. September 7 onwards
On the night of 24/25 August a small force of Heinkels mistakenly dropped their bombs on East London, damaging St. Giles’ Church. In response, on the night of the 28th to the 29th, Bomber Command included Berlin in its attack plans. Hitler was in the Berghof and when he learned of the attack the day all his strength to defend it. On September 7, the Luftwaffe shifted the assault to London.
The Germans felt that the attacked targets had suffered enough damage and an attack on the political heartland would decisively weaken the British. As 11 Group did not expect attacks on London, its forces were not in a position to defend the capital and the Luftwaffe caused much damage, particularly to the docks and houses in the East.
September 7 had been a victory for the bombers
Germans, but by shifting their attack from the airfields, the Luftwaffe gave themselves a chance to recover. London as a target was further inland than previous targets. The squadrons had more time to intercept intruders and the autonomy of the escort fighters was reduced. The decisive day was September 15 when Fighter Command was able to deploy 17 squadrons against the German attacks. After a tough and sustained battle, during which the Luftwaffe lost 60 aircraft, both sides saw that the Germans’ tactics had failed. Fighter Command had not been swept from the skies and invasion was not possible. Fighting continued, sometimes more importantly, for a few weeks in October, the action of September 15 having proven that the Germans could not win the Battle of Britain.
“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”
AVIONICA Watch Special Edition THE FEW – The Battle of Britain
Made in Switzerland. Mark VII movement, sapphire crystal, 316L steel case, 5 ATM water resistant 50 Mts. Cowhide leather strap.
The famous Sector Clock in the RAF Operations Rooms made a special contribution during the Battle of Britain. During the Second World War, Britain was equipped with radar stations, observation posts and operations rooms assigned to control the RAF’s response to German aviation raids.
The receipt of numerous messages to be selected, prioritized and analyzed to allow Spitfires and Hurricanes squadrons to achieve their
goals. All messages when received were given a color, red, yellow or blue according to the time marked by the minute hand on the sector clock, which had the dial painted with triangles of these colors every 5 minutes. This would be the color given to the message and placed on the tablet on the operations table, allowing fighters to be in the air ready to intercept the enemy within 5 minutes of first contact. Without this simple and elegant system, it would have been difficult to maintain control of the skies during the crucial
